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People who feel that a government action inhibits them from exercising
their rights of free expression cannot easily challenge the action in federal
court. Article III of the Constitution requires that the plaintiff in a federal
lawsuit claim to have suffered "personal injury fairly traceable to the de-
fendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the re-
quested relief."1 In Laird v. Tatum,' the Supreme Court held that a gov-
ernment action that "subjectively chills" a person from exercising First
Amendment speech rights,' but does not actually prohibit speech, does not
"injure" the person within the meaning of Article III standing doctrine,
and that federal courts therefore lack the power to hear a case where the
only claimed injury is a subjective chill.
This Note contends that, contrary to the Court's decision in Laird, the
Constitution imposes no barrier to granting standing to plaintiffs who
claim chilling injuries,' whether "subjective" or "objective." Rather, the
barrier to hearing such claims is prudential.5 Courts presented with
claims of chill should determine, case by case, whether the claims are suf-
ficient to overcome the policy reasons that underlie the prudential barrier.
Courts should also be more willing to face such claims on the merits.
Section I of this Note discusses Laird and Meese v. Keene,' the two
leading cases on chilling injuries as a basis for standing. Section II pro-
vides general background on constitutional and prudential barriers to
standing, and, in particular, examines the requirement that the plaintiff in
a federal lawsuit be injured. Section III uses established principles of
standing to demonstrate that a plaintiff suffering chilling injury meets the
constitutional requirement. Section IV advances a separate argument to
show that existing Supreme Court doctrine recognizes chills as injuries for
certain purposes, and argues that they should be so recognized for stand-
ing purposes. Finally, Section V identifies the prudential considerations
raised by judicial recognition of chilling injuries, and suggests that the
1. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
2. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
3. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend
I.
4. The injury that this Note claims a chilling effect causes will be referred to as a "chilling
injury." Unless otherwise noted, "chilling injury" refers to a chilling effect that injures First Amend-
ment rights of free expression.
5. On the difference, see infra Section II.
6. 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
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resulting problems could be resolved if courts would make a preliminary
determination of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's chill, and deal with
chilling claims more forthrightly on the merits.
I. CHILLING CLAIMS IN THE SUPREME COURT
The First Amendment protects against "abridg[ement]" of the freedom
of speech, and a government action that prohibits someone from speaking
on pain of criminal sanction is plainly an abridgement. Government ac-
tion may, however, deter someone from engaging in First Amendment ac-
tivity without actually prohibiting it. This deterrence is a "chilling
effect."
A. Laird v. Tatum
In January 1970, an article in The Washington Monthly revealed that
the United States Army was engaging in surveillance of domestic political
activist groups.8 Arlo Tatum, a member of such a group, felt that the
surveillance, although it did not actually prohibit him from doing any-
thing, deterred him from engaging in expressive and associational activi-
ties. He and others sued the Army for chilling their First Amendment
freedoms. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion made it clear that the plaintiffs
had not surmounted Article III's standing barrier:
". .. to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a
direct injury ...... ...Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not
an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm
or a threat of specific future harm; "the federal courts established
pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory
opinions."9
The Court's opinion did not say whether the fatal flaw in Tatum's com-
plaint was that it alleged only a chill, or that it alleged only a "subjective"
chill. On its face, Laird did not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff
7. Professor Schauer traces the term "chill" to Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), where Justice Frankfurter noted the inhibiting effect loyalty oath re-
quirements can have on teachers. Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 685 & n.1 (1978). Within fifteen years, claims of chilling
effect had become "ubiquitous." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256 n.2 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in judgment).
8. For a good summary of the factual background of the case, see Comment, Laird v. Tatum: The
Supreme Court and a First Amendment Challenge to Military Surveillance of Lawful Civilian Po-
litical Activity, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 244 (1973).
9. 408 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) and United Pub. Work-
ers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)).
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alleging an "objective" chill (whatever that is) might be able to invoke
federal jurisdiction."
The lower courts have reached different conclusions as to what allega-
tions are necessary to support standing on the basis of chill. Some circuits
have suggested that no chill can itself be the basis for standing unless it is
accompanied by some other, objective injury." Others are willing to grant
standing if a chill is made "objective" by evidence,12 but even these courts
have widely differing attitudes as to what an objective chill is, and what
sort of evidence is needed to show it.13
B. Meese v. Keene
The Supreme Court's most recent application of Laird concerned the
Department of Justice's decision to designate three films by the National
Film Board of Canada-two about acid rain and one about the environ-
10. Some courts misconstrue Laird to say that the plaintiffs lacked standing only because they
could not allege that they themselves were targets of Army investigation. E.g., Olagues v. Russoniello,
797 F.2d 1511, 1518 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as moot, 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987). However, although the
majority opinion in Laird does not explicitly say so, the plaintiffs were targets. See 408 U.S. at 26
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Respondents were targets of the Army's surveillance."); see also Tatum v.
Laird, 444 F.2d at 954 n.17 (giving details of surveillance).
Some scholars suggest that the plaintiffs in Laird lacked standing only because, even though they
were subject to Army surveillance, they were not actually chilled by it: They were sufficiently insouci-
ant that they did not curtail their expression just because they were under surveillance. E.g., L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTrIONAL LAW 122 (2d ed. 1988). The Court of Appeals did note that
the plaintiffs were "sufficiently uninhibited to bring this suit," 444 F.2d at 954 n.17, but found that
the Army system of intelligence gathering exercised a "present inhibiting effect" on their speech
rights, id. at 954 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs, at oral argu-
ment, "cast considerable doubt" on whether they were in fact chilled, 408 U.S. at 13 n.7, but also
found that the chill alleged was insufficient to confer standing, id. at 13-14.
The Laird opinion continues to bar much court inquiry into the important question of whether
police organizations must meet any standard before starting to investigate someone. See United Pres-
byterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rubin, The FBI
and Dissidents: A First Amendment Analysis of Attorney General Smith's 1983 FBI Guidelines on
Domestic Security Investigations, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 453, 459-61 (1985); see also F.B.L Papers Show
Wide Surveillance of Reagan Critics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at Al.
11. See, e.g., English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 730 (4th Cir. 1979) (test is whether plaintiff
suffers "subjective chill on her first amendment rights and present objective harm"; court considered
only job demotion and salary decrease to be objective); National Conference of Catholic Bishops v.
Smith, 653 F.2d 535, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Even the 'chilling' of the most protected First
Amendment rights of free speech does not create a case or controversy without a 'specific present
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.'" (quoting 408 U.S. at 13-14)).
12. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
13. For instance, in Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1983),
teachers and students complained that local police forces' sending an undercover officer into class-
rooms to investigate drug abuse chilled their speech in class. Although the plaintiffs were the specific
teachers and students investigated, and although they claimed that open discussion in class had been
stifled, the court held they had no standing, because their chill was "subjective" and not "tangible."
Compare id. with Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1518 (9th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that any
person actually investigated could have standing on basis of chill).
Some courts, citing language from Laird v. Tatum, claim that a chill is objective only when caused
by government action that is "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." E.g., National Fed'n
of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 681 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoting 408 U.S. at 11).
Chills caused by police surveillance would not meet this standard. See 688 F. Supp. at 681 (source of
plaintiffs' fear must be more than knowledge that government is engaged in activity that might pro-
duce information that could be used to plaintiffs' detriment).
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mental effects of nuclear war-as "political propaganda" within the
meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)."' FARA and its
attendant regulations require that any foreign government's American
agent who wishes to distribute a film so designated must register the film
with the Attorney General, insert into its footage a label identifying it as a
film so registered, and submit reports showing to whom the film has been
disseminated. Barry Keene was a member of the California State Senate
who wished to exhibit the films. He was not an agent of any foreign
government, and so, according to the Justice Department, FARA imposed
no duties on him."5 Nevertheless, Keene felt that the very fact that the
Justice Department had designated the films "political propaganda"
chilled him from showing them, and so violated his First Amendment
right of free expression.' He sued to have FARA declared
unconstitutional.
Because FARA did not actually prohibit Keene from expressing himself
in any way, it was difficult to see how the Act injured him, other than by
chilling his First Amendment rights. This seemed to bring Keene within
the scope of Laird v. Tatum. Keene therefore commissioned an opinion
poll, which showed that people would be less inclined to vote for a candi-
date who exhibited films designated "political propaganda" by the Attor-
ney General.' The poll, he argued, showed that his chill was a real in-
jury, and that he therefore had standing.
The Supreme Court, though it held that Keene had standing, reasoned
differently. The Court agreed that Keene "fit[] squarely within" estab-
lished standing guidelines. 8 However, Keene's injury was not a chill to
his First Amendment freedoms. Indeed, the Court said that "[ilf Keene
had merely alleged . . . a chilling effect on the exercise of his First
Amendment rights, he would not have standing," 9 thus suggesting that
no allegation of a chill, no matter how "objective," would itself suffice to
confer standing. The Court found instead that Keene's standing was based
on the reputational injury that the designation threatened.20 This injury,
not the chill, was substantiated by the opinion poll.2
Keene's standing test is fraught with practical difficulty. It seems un-
likely that the Court will find a case or controversy whenever someone
takes an opinion poll that shows that he might suffer reputational injury
14. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982). Regulations implementing FARA appear at 28 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-
5.801 (1987).
15. The Department claimed that Keene could show the films without registering them, showing
their statutory label, or submitting any dissemination reports. See Brief for Appellants at 5.
16. 107 S. Ct. at 1867.
17. Id. at 1867 & n.7.
18. Id. at 1867. The dissent noted its agreement that Keene had standing. Id. at 1873 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting in part). Hence, the finding of standing was unanimous.
19. Id. at 1867.
20. Id. at 1867-68.
21. The Court ruled against Keene on the merits. Id. at 1869-73.
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as a result of government action.22 Although the Court's opinion in Keene
favorably cites Laird v. Tatum, and purports to apply its test, Keene may
well narrow Laird's effect. The plaintiffs in Laird were exposed to far
more reputational injury than Keene. An opinion poll asking whether
people would think less of those under surveillance by the United States
Army would surely reveal that such government activity seriously threat-
ens reputations. 23 Keene may represent a way around the barrier created
by Laird.
II. STANDING BARRIERS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL
A. The Two Standing Barriers
Standing represents one of the many barriers a plaintiff must overcome
to get the merits of her case heard in federal court.24 The barrier consists
of two parts. The first derives from Article III's command that the federal
judicial power extend only to "cases" and "controversies." This constitu-
tional barrier requires that the plaintiff be injured, in a manner fairly
traceable to the defendant, and likely to be remedied by the relief plaintiff
requests. The plaintiff must satisfy these requirements as an "irreducible
minimum" for standing.1
5
Plaintiffs who meet this injury requirement then face the second, "pru-
dential" barrier. This consists of a set of judicially created rules that en-
sure that courts do not decide "abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance," which other governmental institutions might be more competent to
address, in situations where judicial intervention is unnecessary to protect
individual rights.28 The plaintiff must show that her injury is individual,
and not merely a "generalized grievance" with the conduct of govern-
ment;27 the plaintiff must assert that her own rights, not the rights of
third parties, protect her against the injury she has suffered;28 and in cer-
tain cases the plaintiff must show that she falls within the "zone of inter-
ests" of the law whose protection she claims.29
22. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (injury to reputation creates no federal cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause). Keenes recognition
of standing on the basis of potential reputational injury may be its major contribution to standing
doctrine.
23. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 25-26 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. Standing is an indispensable element of federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a law-
suit. E.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737 (1984); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
616 (1973). State courts are not bound by federal rules of standing. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 429 (1952).
25. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
26. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
27. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974).
28. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Since the rule against third-party standing is prudential, rather than
constitutional, the Court allows exceptions. See infra notes 30 & 77-84 and accompanying text.
29. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The Court
recently held that the "zone of interests" test is most usefully understood as a gloss on § 10 of the
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The crucial difference between these two types of standing barriers is
that a plaintiff lacking constitutional standing has no way to get into fed-
eral court: Hearing her case would violate Article III. The prudential
standing barrier, however, consists only of rules of self-restraint imposed
by courts. Therefore, if a plaintiff satisfies Article III's standing require-
ments, a court may, in an appropriate case, permit her to advance a claim
that a prudential standing rule usually would block.30
B. The Taxonomy of Injury
This Note contends that a chilling effect on one's First Amendment
rights can constitute an injury sufficient to meet the constitutional stand-
ing barrier. To understand whether this is true, one must know what
sorts of injuries count for standing purposes. 3 '
Early standing cases required that a plaintiff challenging government
action show that the action injured a "legal right" of the plaintiff's. In
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TV'A, 2 for example, a power company
challenged the constitutionality of the act creating the Tennessee Valley
Authority. The Supreme Court held that the power company lacked
standing because the only injury it could show was that the TVA, by
coming into existence, would compete with it and possibly cause a compet-
itive loss. This was not an injury for standing purposes, since the com-
pany had no legal right to be free from government competition.
In 1970, the Court decided that this test for standing really went to the
merits of a case: In order to show standing to sue, one apparently had to
show a legal right to win. 3 In Association of Data Processing Services
Organizations (ADAPSO) v. Camp,"4 the Court therefore replaced the le-
gal interest test with the "injury in fact" test. The claim of the plaintiffs
in ADAPSO was very similar to the claim in Tennessee Electric Power.
They alleged that new government regulations allowing banks to provide
data processing services would hurt them competitively. This time, how-
ever, the Court held that a plaintiff injured "in fact" by government ac-
tion has Article III standing to challenge it, even if the injury did not
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982); it serves to delimit the class of plaintiffs
who can seek review of agency action under the APA. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388,
394-400, 400 n.16 (1987).
30. For instance, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the principal plaintiff's claim became
moot while appeal was pending. A secondary plaintiff's claim remained live, and she had sufficient
injury to satisfy Article III's standing barrier, but her claim depended on third-party rights. Since the
rule against hearing such claims was not constitutionally compelled, and since she continued to press
her claim "vigorously and 'cogently,'" the Court held that denying her standing would "serve no
functional purpose." Id. at 192-94. The Court therefore heard the case.
31. For a more detailed treatment of standing doctrine, see Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 68 (1984); Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes when Constitutional Rights Are
Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57 (1985).
32. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).




invade the plaintiff's legal rights and even though the plaintiff might lose
the case on the merits.
Since ADAPSO, numerous Supreme Court cases have decided whether
a particular plaintiff's claim alleged an "injury in fact."3" The cases have
produced no clear definition of the term. The Court itself recently said
that injury in fact "cannot be defined so as to make application of the
constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise;" 6 courts, in
determining whether a plaintiff has standing, must rely on their ability to
analogize to previous cases.37
One principle, however, emerges clearly from the cases: The realm of
judicially cognizable injuries encompasses injuries other than the economic
or bodily injuries that traditionally gave rise to an action at law. Indeed, if
"injury in fact" is to have any meaning other than injury to a legal right,
it must mean that the plaintiff need show only an injury that is "real and
concrete and accepted as such without the need to find that the law pro-
tects against it." '38 A plaintiff may, for instance, claim injury if a park or
pond she uses is threatened by pollution.3 The debasement of one's vote
by malapportionment is also an injury that confers standing.4" White ten-
ants can sue their landlords for discriminatorily denying apartments in
their building to blacks, because this practice injures them by inflicting a
"loss of important benefits from interracial associations. " "'
Demonstrating injury in fact is the process of demonstrating to the
court that something bad has happened to the plaintiff, something suffi-
ciently bad that society should recognize it as an injury. As Professor
Burnham puts it, "the post-[ADAPSO] litigant no longer need show that
the interest allegedly injured is legally secured in the sense of being pro-
tected by positive law. Instead, it is sufficient that the interest exists in a
non-legal value system shared by society." '42 The plaintiff claiming a novel
35. See, e.g., cases cited in L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 79-113.
36. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Standing doctrine is further complicated by deci-
sions in which the Court manipulates it for political or ideological reasons, a problem the Justices
themselves have noted. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 103
(1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting Court found standing only because it wished to deliver
advisory opinion concerning constitutionality of Price-Anderson Act).
37. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 751-52; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 115 ("[N]o general
definition of the requirement is truly satisfactory. .. ").
38. Burnham, supra note 31, at 60; see also ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 158 ("Whether anything in
the [statutes in question] gives petitioners a 'legal interest' that protects them against violations of
those Acts, . . . are questions which go to the merits . . ").
39. See Duke Power; United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972).
42. Burnham, supra note 31, at 61; see also J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE
OF PUBLIC LAW 61 (1978). It may seem hollow comfort for a plaintiff to obtain standing to sue on
the basis of an injury that violated no legal right of the plaintiff's, since it would then appear that the
plaintiff must lose the case. But such a plaintiff has the advantage of being able to challenge the action
on other grounds. For example, the plaintiffs in Duke Power, after gaining standing on the grounds
that the building of a nuclear power plant would injure them by raising the temperature of a pond
1989]
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sort of injury-as injuries to environmental interests, apportionment
power, and interracial association once were-must convince the courts
that society should value their loss.4
It is important to realize that the injury in fact test did not supplant the
legal rights test, but supplemented it. An "injury in fact" can still consist
solely of an invasion of a legal right conferred by the positive law.""
Under current doctrine, an invasion of a legally protected right is an in-
jury in fact.
45
III. CHILLING EFFECTS AS INJURIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDING PURPOSES
When the government takes action that chills people from exercising
their rights of free expression, it both violates their legal rights and injures
them in fact. The violated legal rights are grounded in the First Amend-
ment. The injury in fact is to America's fundamental value of free
expression.
they used for recreation, were allowed to challenge an Act of Congress limiting the liability of power
companies in the event of a nuclear accident. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 62-63.
43. "[T]he concept of cognizable harm [is not] self-defining. Nor [is] the process of determining
harm ... value-free. . . .In large part, therefore, the Court's recognition of injury ... depends on
its sympathy for and understanding of the loss." Nichol, supra note 31, at 89-90.
44. For instance, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), black and white
"testers" asked realtors for housing information. The realtors falsely told the black testers that no
housing was available in certain white neighborhoods. When the testers sued, the defendants argued
that since the testers were not really planning to use the housing information, they were not injured in
fact by false information. The Supreme Court held, however, that the black testers had standing. The
Fair Housing Act, the Court noted, gives everyone a right to truthful housing information. If this
right of the testers was violated, they had standing. See id. at 373.
Standing may also exist solely by virtue of the invasion of a right protected by the Constitution. In
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), for example, the plaintiff claimed that a certain federal
pension benefit law discriminated against men. The law's severability prdvision provided that if its
discrimination was found unconstitutional, the Court should strike the whole benefit, rather than give
it to men as well as women. When Mathews, a man, sued, he claimed that the severability clause was
an attempt to deny him standing, for it meant that he could claim no injury that the courts could
redress: Even if he won his case on the merits, he would not get the benefit he sought. The Court,
however, found that the equal protection clause of the Constitution itself confers a right to equal
treatment. Because this legal right was violated, Mathews had standing.
The Court has sometimes been reluctant to find that certain clauses of the Constitution give rise to
individual rights, the invasion of which creates standing. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (incompatibility clause does not give every citizen standing to challenge
congressman's membership in reserve army). However, the Court has recognized standing based on
violations of constitutional due process rights, voting rights, and the establishment clause. See Burn-
ham, supra note 31, at 71-94. In addition, the capacity of many constitutional provisions to give rise
to standing is obvious. These are generally the provisions that describe personal rights, rather than
those that impose structural prohibitions on the behavior of government. For instance, no one would
question the standing of someone to object that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been vio-
lated in a criminal case.
45. For clarity, this Note will use the term "injury in fact" only when referring to the sort of
injury that confers standing regardless of whether it invades legal rights. When an injury to legal
rights is meant, this Note will always say "injury to legal rights" explicitly.
Chilling Injuries
A. Chill as Injury to Legal Rights
The First Amendment's free speech clause grants all Americans the le-
gal right to express themselves through speech, and a loss of this right
constitutes a serious injury."' A government action that exerts only a chil-
ling effect on expression, by definition, does not directly and affirmatively
prohibit it. Many Supreme Court cases show, however, that actions short
of complete prohibitions of protected speech can invade free speech rights.
A government-caused inhibition of speech can itself be an injury. Taxa-
tion of speech can constitute injury,47 for example, as can a requirement
that one register before making a lawful speech."' The government de-
fendants in Bantam Books v. Sullivan9 injured the plaintiffs simply by
sending them an official letter suggesting that some of their publications
were "completely objectionable for sale . . . for youths," even though no
penalties attached to such a letter. In Lamont v. Postmaster General,5"
the Court found that for the government to label certain mail "communist
political propaganda," and require its addressees to make a special re-
quest in order to receive it, constituted injury. "[Any addressee is likely to
feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have
condemned as 'communist political propaganda,'" the Court noted.5"
The Court has thus held that even subtle inhibition of speech can injure
the legal rights of the inhibited party, for "[it is characteristic of the free-
doms of expression in general that they are vulnerable to gravely damag-
ing yet barely visible encroachments." 2 Moreover, recognition of a chill to
constitutional rights as an injury to those rights is not unique to the First
Amendment area. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists,5" the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that
imposed various procedural burdens on women who wished to exercise
their right to obtain abortions. The Court noted that it "consistently has
refused to allow government to chill the exercise of constitutional rights by
requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes unpopular, activities.
Pennsylvania's reporting requirements . . . pose an unacceptable danger
of deterring the exercise of [abortion] right[s], and must be invalidated.""M
46. "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion).
47. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
48. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
49. 372 U.S. 58, 62 n.5 (1963).
50. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
51. Id. at 307.
52. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66; cf Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First
Amendment Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. REV. 196, 218-20 (1970).
53. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
54. Id. at 767-68 (citations omitted); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state
law denying welfare benefits to residents of less than one year's standing unconstitutionally chills right
to travel); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808, 832-40 (1969)
(some cases that do not explicitly mention chill are best understood as judicial attempts to remedy
chilling injury).
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These cases demonstrate that a chilling effect on expression counts as
an injury to the legal rights conferred by the First Amendment. As Justice
Brennan puts it, "inhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of
precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to government."5 For
this reason, the chilled plaintiff has suffered an injury sufficient to confer
constitutional standing to sue.
B. Chill as Injury in Fact
A chill to free speech injures a value Americans hold dear-the ability
to speak out on public issues in a debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."56 Americans share a "remarkably broad consensus on the
kinds of messages the government should leave alone."' 57 Panegyrics to
freedom of expression form some of our most respected texts."' When the
government inhibits people from speaking, it hurts them in a way our
society should notice.59
"Chilling effect" is no mere rubric artfully employed by people seeking
standing. Government disapproval or surveillance can have a significantly
injurious effect on a person's expressive behavior. The author Howard
Fast, for instance, commenting on the F.B.I.'s practice of maintaining files
on virtually all popular American writers, said, "[t]he terrible thing the
F.B.I. did was to destroy social writing in America. . . . The social view
of the writer has been terrified out of existence, and that is a great tragedy
for American literature."60
The Supreme Court has repeatedly shown its concern for this injury. In
Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co.,"' professional fun-
draisers challenged a Maryland law prohibiting charities from paying a
fundraising fee of more than twenty-five percent of the amount raised.
The Court noted that the fundraisers, although injured in fact, were at-
tempting to raise third party rights (those of the charities) in their chal-
lenge. Nonetheless, the Court granted them standing:
Even where a First Amendment challenge could be brought by one
actually engaged in protected activity, there is a possibility that,
rather than risk punishment . . . .he will refrain from engaging
further in the protected activity. Society as a whole then would be
55. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
57. H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 6 (1988).
58. E.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1873), cited in, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964); T. JEFFERSON, The Kentucky Resolutions, in THE COMPLETE JEF-
FERSON 128 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
59. Mill specifically notes the "baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the
moral nature of man, unless this liberty [of expression] is either conceded, or asserted in spite of
prohibition . . . ." J.S. MILL, supra note 58, at ch. 3.
60. Robins, The Defiling of Writers, 245 NATION 367, 369 (1987).
61. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
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the loser. Thus, when there is a danger of chilling free speech, the
concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible
may be outweighed by society's interest in having the statute
challenged.62
The Court also showed sympathy for those chilled from expressing
themselves in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.6' Although the Court held
that libelous speech may be punished in tort, it also ruled that a public
official could not recover against a newspaper for libel unless the newspa-
per published false and defamatory statements with actual malice. The
Court was not applauding libel; it was expressing its concern for those
who might refrain from engaging in protected speech for fear of falling
into the proscribed category. The Court stressed that "[a] rule compelling
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual asser-
tions . . . leads to . . . 'self-censorship.' . . . Under such a rule, would-
be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism,
even though it is ...in fact true ....""
These cases show that our society does care about those inhibited from
speaking. The ultimate evidence of our concern is the First Amendment
itself. This may seem to be double counting, for the argument claims that
the cases show both injury to legal rights and injury in fact. But there is
no paradox here: a society's positive law shapes, as well as reflects, its
non-legal value systems.
This interaction is well illustrated by the gradual recognition of injuries
to environmental interests. As one scholar remarks, "One can recall when
the courts would have called a plaintiff claiming harm because of the acid-
ification of a stream in a nearby national forest an interloper asserting no
injury whatsoever."'6 5 Society, however, has become more concerned about
damage to the environment. Congress, in 1970, passed the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act.66 Eventually, courts recognized environmental in-
terests as "important ingredients of the quality of life in our society,"
'67
and granted standing to sue on the basis of injury to them.
The First Amendment both codifies and encourages a view of the abil-
ity to speak as an important social value. The Supreme Court's recogni-
62. Id. at 956.
63. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
64. Id. at 279 (quoted in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)); see
also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 580-81 (1977) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (allowing right of publicity to prevail over First Amendment would lead to self-censorship); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (newspaper cannot be prevented from publish-
ing name of rape victim; allowing right of privacy to prevail would lead to "timidity and self-
censorship" on part of newspapers). Mark Yudof provides further discussion of the power of govern-
ment to affect public discourse. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983).
65. Nichol, supra note 31, at 89.
66. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(1982)).
67. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
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tion that government action that induces self-censorship can violate the
First Amendment is also a recognition that self-censorship is a harm
against which the courts may guard. The ability to speak freely is an
"important ingredient of the quality of life in our society." When some-
one's ability to speak is impaired by government action, that person is
injured in fact, and so meets the constitutional test for standing.
C. The Subjective Nature of Chilling Injuries
As noted earlier,68 Laird v. Tatum did not declare that Article III bars
the federal courts from hearing any case in which standing rests solely on
chilling injury. The case held that a "purely subjective" chill cannot suf-
fice to show injury. The Court tacitly left open the possibility that an
"objective" chill could form the basis for standing. In fact, however, there
is no constitutional distinction between objective and subjective injuries for
standing purposes. Nothing in Article III bars the exercise of federal judi-
cial power in a case where injury is subjective.
Laird v. Tatum did not clarify the difference between objective and
subjective chills, and the lower courts have not reached agreement on the
meanings of these terms.69 The trouble is that courts have used the terms
in chilling cases without really defining them. A subjective claim is one
about someone's state of mind. An objective claim is one about some
worldly condition other than a person's state of mind.7
0
The federal courts are reluctant to allow parties to invoke their jurisdic-
tion on the basis of subjective allegations, even if they are made in good
faith. For instance, a federal court will not simply take a plaintiff's word
as proof that she has not been made party to a case for the sole purpose of
manufacturing diversity jurisdiction. 71 Similarly, a plaintiff's subjective
fear of a future suit by the defendant is not sufficient to create jurisdiction
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 2 In making these decisions, how-
68. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
70. This usage is reflected in numerous Supreme Court opinions from diverse areas of law. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1988) (whether police officer believes search is
lawful is subjective; whether reasonable police officer could so have believed is objective); I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987) (whether refugee fears persecution is subjective;
whether there is clear probability of persecution is objective); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469
U.S. 24, 35-36 (1984) (market value of land is objective; value to owner because of idiosyncratic
attachment is subjective); Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 465 n.9 (1982)
(intent of voters in limiting school board's power to bus students is subjective; difference between
resultant school board authority and normal school board authority is objective).
As these examples show, the question of whether a person actually believes something is subjective,
but the question of whether a reasonable person would share that belief is objective. This will be
important in Section V. Objectivity should also be distinguished from good faith. A claim is made in
good faith when the claimant is not knowingly lying. Good faith is always required of parties in
federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
71. Martinez v. United States Olympic Comm., 802 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986).




ever, courts have not claimed to be following a constitutional command.
Principles of sound judicial administration might fully explain the insis-
tence on objective evidence to support jurisdiction."3
With regard to Article III standing, the question is whether Article III
itself forbids federal courts to exercise judicial power over a claim of in-
jury if that injury is "purely subjective." The answer is no: Article III
allows federal courts to recognize subjective injury in the same way that
they recognize other injuries. This is shown most clearly in the desegrega-
tion cases.
At one time in our nation's history, the injury felt by blacks who lived
in forced segregation from whites was thought to be purely subjective.
When blacks complained about a Louisiana law that required them to
ride in railroad cars separate from whites (but otherwise supposedly equal
in quality), the Supreme Court said,
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction on it.74
The Court accordingly ruled against the plaintiffs.
Sixty years later, the Court again faced a claim that segregation, this
time in schools, constituted injury. Significantly, the Court did not alter its
position that such injury was subjective. But, citing then-recent cases con-
cerning higher education, it showed far greater sympathy for such injury:
In Sweatt v. Painter, . . . this Court relied in large part on "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, the Court. . . again resorted to intangible considera-
tions . . . . Such considerations apply with added force to children
in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 5
73. Indeed, in at least one area, federal courts allow a subjective claim to determine a constitu-
tional element of their subject-matter jurisdiction. State citizenship for purposes of the diversity juris-
diction is determined by domicile, which contains an inherently subjective element, namely, a party's
intent to make a certain place her home. E.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 842 (1974). Courts have generally held that they will accept, or at least give weight to, a
party's good-faith allegation of intention. See Lewis v. Splashdam By-Products Corp., 233 F. Supp.
47, 49 (W.D. Va. 1964) (plaintiff allowed to claim Illinois domicile, even though he had resided in
Virginia for thirty years); Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1973) (district court erred in
refusing to give weight to expressed intention of federal prisoner to make state in which he was
involuntarily serving life sentence his home).
74. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
75. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (citations omitted) (empha-
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The injury was still subjective, but the Court found that no obstacle to
granting relief.
Brown did not explicitly hold that the subjective injuries discussed were
"injuries in fact" supporting standing, for the "injury in fact" test was not
created until sixteen years after the Brown decision. But the Court did
show that there is no fundamental difference, no constitutional difference,
between a subjective injury and any other: The courts will take cogni-
zance of a subjective injury if societal values have evolved to a point where
society does regard the claimed injury as a real one. Article III does not
itself forbid judges to hear claims of subjective injuries. The question, as
with all injuries, is whether the plaintiffs can convince the courts that
something bad has happened to them. In Brown, they did, and the Court
ordered the segregation ended."
IV. OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE AND CHILLING EFFECTS
Courts need not rely entirely on first principles of standing to conclude
that a chilling effect should count as an injury for standing purposes. The
First Amendment "overbreadth" doctrine already recognizes chilling ef-
fects as injuries for third-party standing purposes. The refusal to recog-
nize them for first-party standing purposes is anomalous.
Overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the normal, prudential standing
principle that parties in federal court cannot raise the rights of others as a
defense to an action against themselves. In particular, parties cannot nor-
mally claim that because a law would be unconstitutional if applied to
others, it must not be applied to them. For instance, in United States v.
Raines,7 the United States alleged that various Georgia state election of-
ficials violated federal laws prohibiting "any person" from depriving an-
other of the right to vote on account of race. The defendants replied that,
as worded, the law reached purely private action, and so exceeded Con-
gress's constitutional powers. Since the defendants were not private actors,
the Supreme Court refused to entertain this argument. The Court held
that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that . . . its application [to
others] might be unconstitutional.""8
sis added).
76. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The Brown I Court did consider
psychological studies of the likely effects of segregation on the plaintiffs' lives and self-images. See
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. But, as the quoted language shows, these studies were of subjective
effects: They did not change the nature of the injury itself. If Plessy's counsel had presented the Court
with a study showing that segregation in public transportation damaged blacks' self-images, the Court
would not have granted relief. The difficulty with Plessy's case was not that the Court did not believe
that the plaintiffs felt denigrated, but that it did not care. When society began to care about the
subjective injury caused by segregation, the Court took judicial cognizance of it.
77. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
78. Id. at 21. Raines was a civil case, but its rule applies equally to criminal cases. See, e.g.,
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 132 n.4 (1979) (defendant convicted by unanimous six-member
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In the First Amendment area, the Supreme Court has recognized a
unique exception to this rule. The Court permits a person prosecuted
under a statute criminalizing some form of expression to argue that even
if his expression is not constitutionally protected, the statute is overbroad;
that is, the statute might be used to prosecute the constitutionally pro-
tected expression of others. If the defendant succeeds in showing that the
statute has the potential to violate First Amendment rights, the court will
declare the statute unconstitutional "on its face," 9 and the defendant will
go free, even though under a narrower statute his speech might have been
prohibited. Overbreadth doctrine thus allows a criminal defendant whose
constitutional rights have not been violated to raise the rights of hypotheti-
cal third parties as a barrier to his prosecution.80
The Court has repeatedly explained that this exception to ordinary
standing rules rests on the chilling effect of statutes that proscribe expres-
sion.8 If a statute criminalizes both protected and unprotected speech, it
will chill people from expressing themselves in protected ways. People
will not risk criminal penalties even if they believe that the Constitution
would protect them from prosecution. The Court has held that the impor-
tance of the First Amendment's freedom of expression to our society dic-
tates that we not allow a chilling statute to remain on the books, for "the
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go un-
punished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others
may be muted . . . because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes."
'82
The chill an overbroad statute imposes on third parties must therefore
be an injury to those parties. What injury justifies setting free a criminal
defendant whose constitutional rights have not been violated? It cannot be
an injury claimed by the defendant himself. He faces a possible fine or jail
term, which is certainly an injury. So, however, does every criminal de-
fendant, and yet, as we have seen, outside the First Amendment context
defendants are not permitted to argue that they should go free because
jury may not complain that statute under which he was convicted unconstitutionally allows conviction
by 5-1 vote); Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302, 1305 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1976) (person
convicted of sodomy may not claim that statute under which he was convicted unconstitutionally pro-
hibits sexual relations between consenting adults, if jury found that his partner did not consent);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973) (person clearly within proscription of criminal
statute may not claim that statute is unconstitutionally vague as to others).
79. E.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2508 (1987).
80. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). The Supreme Court later insisted that
the statute in question be "substantially overbroad" for the defendant to take advantage of the over-
breadth rule. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987) (over-
broad statute "threatens others not before the court-those who desire to engage in legally protected
expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution. ... ); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("the statute's very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.").
82. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
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others might be unconstitutionally prosecuted under a statute constitu-
tional as to them. Nor can the criminal penalties that might be imposed
on the hypothetical defendants suffice, for those defendants could assert
their valid constitutional defenses if they were ever prosecuted. The only
injury available to support overbreadth doctrine is the chilling injury to
those who would engage in constitutionally protected expression but for
their fear of prosecution.
Overbreadth doctrine thus shows not only that chilling effects are inju-
ries, but that they are injuries of a particularly serious and noteworthy
kind. They are so serious that we make an exception to normal standing
principles, and allow criminal defendants to go free, in order to protect
against chilling injuries to third parties.83 Yet when the third party shows
up in court himself as plaintiff and claims chilling injury, the Supreme
Court refuses to hear the case, and tells him that he is not even injured.
This anomaly should be eliminated: The party actually suffering chilling
injury should be allowed to plead his case himself.8 '
V. THE PRUDENTIAL BARRIER TO CHILLING CLAIMS
The preceding arguments do not prove that courts should allow all
plaintiffs claiming chill to invoke federal jurisdiction. The federal courts
have Article III power to hear such claims, but have wisely declined to
open their doors to all of them. A prudential barrier still stands between
the chilled plaintiff and her day in court. Courts must decide which claims
of chill they should hear.
A. Sources of the Prudential Barrier
The reasons underlying the courts' reluctance to hear claims of chill are
not difficult to discern. One reason is the possibility of "opening the flood-
gates" to any plaintiff willing to allege a chilling effect. Many plaintiffs
currently thought to be complaining of "generalized grievances" with the
conduct of government might in good faith claim some chill to their free
83. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that the chilling effect of
statutes prohibiting expression is such a serious injury that, contrary to normal principles of federal-
ism, the federal courts can enjoin the states from bringing prosecutions under them. Although the
Court substantially limited Dombrowski in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), it did not decide
that chilling effects should no longer be regarded as injuries. Rather, it decided only that they were
not serious enough to overcome the federalism concerns implicated in Dombrowski once a state actu-
ally begins a prosecution. See 401 U.S. at 54-55 (Stewart, J. concurring) (emphasizing narrowness of
holding); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (federal court may still issue declaratory
judgment that state statute is unconstitutional provided no state prosecution is pending).
84. Confronting this argument in a case where such a plaintiff claimed chill, Judge (now Justice)
Scalia suggested that in other cases where courts cite chilling effect, chill is "the reason why the
governmental imposition is invalid rather than . . . the harm which entitles the plaintiff to challenge
it." United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But
the harm suffered by a defendant in an overbreadth case is his potential jail sentence, and that injury
is normally regarded as insufficient to allow a facial challenge to a statute that is valid as applied.
Some other injury must justify such a challenge, and this must be the chilling injury to third parties.
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speech rights, forcing the government to defend these cases on their merits.
For example, the plaintiffs in Schlesinger v. Reservists, 5 who challenged
the ability of members of Congress to hold commissions in the armed
forces reserve, might have claimed they were chilled from speaking out
against the reserves. Requiring the courts to hear all such cases could
effectively destroy the constitutional standing barrier.
The other reason for the courts' exercise of prudence is that unques-
tioning acceptance of subjective claims of chill for standing purposes poses
a difficult problem when a court reaches the merits. Depending on one's
First Amendment jurisprudence, to say that a chill is a cognizable injury
to First Amendment rights may be to decide the merits of the claim. A
First Amendment absolutist who accepted subjective chill as injury to
First Amendment rights would be hard pressed to avoid automatically
striking down the chilling act on the merits. The Supreme Court may
therefore be exercising its "passive virtues" by using the standing barrier
as a way to get rid of cases involving chilling claims instead of answering
the difficult First Amendment questions such cases pose.86
The difficulty of these questions may explain the Court's peculiar han-
dling of the alleged chill in Meese v. Keene. In the section on standing, the
Court found that the term "political propaganda" threatened to cause cog-
nizable injury to Keene's reputation. The Court noted that even though
Keene could minimize the risk of such injury by making positive state-
ments about the quality of the films, the need to do this would itself con-
stitute an injury." Yet when it reached the merits of the case, the Court
made the surprising assertion that "the Act places no burden on protected
expression.""8 In support of this, it even noted that if Keene feared the
term "propaganda" might prejudice his viewers, he could advise them that
the films had not been officially censured. 9 Somehow, the reputational
injury Keene might suffer if he engaged in free expression was serious
enough to give him standing, but not to burden his First Amendment
rights. The Court could not have indulged in this sleight of hand if it had
recognized Keene's chill itself as the injury that gave rise to standing.
B. Overcoming the Barrier
1. Reasonableness
The circumstances of a particular case may overcome a prudential bar-
rier that would normally bar standing. Courts should examine the facts of
each case involving chill to see if they allay the fears on which the pru-
85. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
86. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962).
87. Keene, 107 S. Ct. at 1868.
88. Id. at 1871.
89. Id.
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dential barrier is based. The language of Laird, emphasizing the subjec-
tive nature of the plaintiff's chill, suggests one test courts could use.
Courts might defend their dockets against spurious cases by insisting that
a plaintiff allege facts that give the chill an objective basis. The standard
for testing a claim of chill would be the standard that rules all such claims
in our legal system: the reasonable person test. The trial court would ask
whether the challenged governmental action would chill a reasonable per-
son in the way the plaintiff claims to be chilled. This test would divorce
the question of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's chill for standing purposes
from the legal nature of the chill's cause.90
Reasonableness does not make the chill itself objective. No evidence,
other than the plaintiff's own testimony, can show that government action
really chilled the plaintiff. All chills are subjective, but subjective chills
can be reasonable or unreasonable. Section III showed that a good-faith
allegation of a subjective chill should suffice for Article III standing. As a
prudential matter, courts should insist that the plaintiff produce evidence
that his chill is reasonable.91
In the period between Laird v. Tatum and Meese v. Keene, many
lower courts have used such a reasonableness test as the appropriate de-
terminant of standing for claims of chill. As one court put it, "[i]n the
years since Tatum, courts have struggled to determine when a surveillance
system became so intrusive as to create a reasonable or objective chill in a
plaintiff and therefore present a justiciable controversy."" 2 This lower
90. The test could make a crucial difference in the most important class of unresolved chilling
cases, the police surveillance cases. See supra note 10.
91. This test may seem to call upon the federal district judge to make nice determinations of
reasonableness based on only preliminary information, but it is the test used when any plaintiff seeks
a declaratory judgment of her rights. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982),
such a plaintiff must show that an "actual controversy" exists between her and the defendant. Courts
have frequently used a reasonableness test to determine whether there is such a controversy. See, e.g.,
Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (when seeking
declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, plaintiff must show that defendant has "engaged in conduct
that created. . . a reasonable apprehension that [the plaintiff] will face an infringement suit . . ");
Chesney v. Adams, 377 F. Supp. 887 (D. Conn. 1974) (prison inmate's reasonable fear of being
transferred under allegedly unconstitutional statute presents justiciable controversy), affd, 508 F.2d
836 (2d Cir. 1975). Furthermore, courts must make this determination on a case by case basis. See
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
Significantly, this test is also applied when plaintiffs claim to be chilled by laws that do proscribe
expression but that have not yet been applied against them. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
459 (1974); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625 n.1
(1986) ("Steffel held that a reasonable threat of prosecution for conduct allegedly protected by the
Constitution gives rise to a sufficiently ripe controversy."); Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 636, 642 (1988) (plaintiffs had standing because they had "an actual [that is, subjec-
tive] and well-founded [that is, reasonable] fear that the law will be enforced against them.").
92. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Il. 1985)
(emphasis added). Those courts that subscribe to this theory have variously referred to a sufficient
chill as "reasonable," id., "objective," id., or "well-founded," American Booksellers, 108 S. Ct. at
647. Of course, not all courts currently adopt this approach. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
text.
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court experience has elucidated the test by revealing factors a court will
consider in determining whether a claim of chill is reasonable.9"
Meese v. Keene offered a particularly attractive opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to adopt the reasonableness standard, because the plaintiff
had taken pains to amass evidence of the reasonableness of his chill. Not
every plaintiff, however, need be as energetic as Keene. The cases between
Laird and Keene show that the courts are capable of judging the reasona-
bleness of a claim of chill without the aid of an opinion poll.
2. Approaching the Merits
The difficulty of dealing with chilling effects on the merits is a question
of substantive First Amendment law, and courts should approach it on
that basis. As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment bars some government action that discourages but does not
prohibit speech.94 But the Court has never suggested that every chilling
effect, however slight, is forbidden; it has always employed some balanc-
ing of governmental interests against the chilled activity.9" This seems cor-
rect: Government activity that places no actual restrictions on expression
surely raises different constitutional concerns than activity that explicitly
regulates or proscribes expression."' Were this not so, almost any govern-
ment activity would be vulnerable to First Amendment challenge, for
there is always some reluctance to criticize the government.
97
93. For example, when police surveillance consists only of collection of publicly available informa-
tion and attendance at public meetings, a court typically finds no reasonable chill, see, e.g., Philadel-
phia Yearly Meeting of Religious Soe'y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975),
but reasonable chill is often found when police actually infiltrate private meetings, see Handschu v.
Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Courts have considered whether the govern-
ment singled out an individual plaintiff for unusual surveillance, or simply performed a routine secur-
ity check, see Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the possible adverse
effects that being under surveillance might have on the plaintiff's employment, see Socialist Workers
Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (Marshall, Circuit Justice 1974); Clark, 750 F.2d at 93,
and the effect government action might have on the plaintiff's reputation, see Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.
Supp. 561, 568 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub. nom Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d
272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). No one factor is dispositive, but courts use all
of these factors as indicia of the reasonableness of a chill.
Although a reasonableness test may require the district court to hear evidence, it need not lead to a
full trial. A recent District of Columbia case details the procedures a district court should use. Haase
v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
95. See Note, supra note 54, at 822-24. The Court has also used balancing when the plaintiff's
activity falls outside the most traditional forms of expression. In Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), plaintiffs who wished to stage a sleep-in protest challenged a
regulation that prohibited sleeping in a public park. The Court recognized that overnight sleeping in
connection with a demonstration may be "expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First
Amendment." Id. at 293. Yet, after balancing the plaintiff's First Amendment interest against the
government's interest in maintaining the park, it upheld the regulation.
96. Even in cases where speech is prohibited, the Court has never held all speech to be absolutely
protected. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (balancing of speech rights against
national security interests).
97.
[T]o say that a regulation is unconstitutional because it has a chilling effect on protected activ-
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If the Supreme Court had been willing to apply a balancing test in
Meese v. Keene, it could have recognized chill as Keene's true injury, and
yet held that chill alone, in the absence of any formal proscription on
expression, was insufficient to warrant striking down FARA. Instead, the
Court was forced to deny that FARA placed any burden on expression at
all. By recognizing the difference between chill and other types of First
Amendment injury, the Court could have explained its opinion more
candidly.s
VI. CONCLUSION
Laird v. Tatum created significant limits on the power of citizens to
challenge government actions that have important effects on their expres-
sive activities but fall short of actual proscriptions. Meese v. Keene may
represent a way around the barrier created by Laird v. Tatum. If the
Supreme Court does no more than treat seriously its holding that opinion
polls showing potential reputational harm can form the basis for standing,
then many currently excluded plaintiffs may have access to court.
The creation of this new access has not, however, been without cost in
doctrinal confusion. The Supreme Court's characterization of the reasons
why plaintiffs claiming chills to their rights might lack standing to do so
could still prevent consideration of the merits of many worthy claims. By
reconceptualizing the standing barrier to chills as prudential rather than
constitutional, the Court could allow appropriate chilling claims to be
heard, while not opening the floodgates to wholly meritless litigation.
ity is to say virtually nothing at all. What we must look for is some way of determining under
what circumstances the inevitable chilling effect becomes great enough to require judicial in-
validation of legislative enactments ....
Schauer, supra note 7, at 701.
98. Using this sort of balancing approach in a First Amendment context does have familiar dan-
gers. In many contexts, the Court has extended a constitutional right from an area where it is more or
less absolute to an area where the Court felt it appropriate to balance the right against a government
interest. This balancing approach may later invade the area previously thought to provide absolute
protection. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending Fourth Amendment pro-
tections from home to unfamiliar contexts); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987) (applying
balancing tests formulated in these contexts to conclude that probationer's home may be searched
without warrant or probable cause). This Note's suggestion of balancing in chilling cases should not
be taken as suggesting that balancing is appropriate in cases where speech is actually prohibited; that
should be a separate question. But it is a question to be decided on the merits, not by distorting
standing doctrine.
Some commentators applaud the Supreme Court's use of justiciability doctrines to avoid difficult
substantive questions. E.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 86. In rejecting that view, this Note contends that
the country would be better served by judicial candor. See G. CALABRESI, A CoMNMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES 178-81 (1982); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,
578-79 (1985).
For suggestions as to how courts should handle the merits of chilling claims, see Schauer, supra
note 7.
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